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ABSTRACT
The orthodox understanding of the fate of the demobilized Continental Army
soldiers holds that extended military service disadvantaged men in their
subsequent civilian lives. Supposedly, the men never regained the years of
service to their country and paid the price in lost wages, social status, and
marriage opportunities until the nation belatedly and niggardly offered m eager
pensions starting in 1819. In contradiction to prevailing historiography, this paper
argues military service and training equipped Continental Army junior leaders
with skills critical to their postwar su ccess when they moved to new communities
a s the nation expanded. Through a combination of long-term service, von
Steuben’s manual and training program, and merit-based promotions, the
Continental Army created a competent corps of sergeants, lieutenants, and
captains. Their diaries and letters show the junior leaders understood the
changes they had undergone while fighting in the war. When matched against
the tenets written in von Steuben’s manual, there em erged a remarkable
correlation. While militarily com petent and tactically proficient in drill and
maneuver, these junior leaders also left the army with skills they could transfer to
civilian pursuits. While not profiting financially from their military service, the
junior leaders used their newfound abilities to achieve political su ccess at the
local level and assist in the expansion of the Early Republic. The Continental
Army served as a leadership school for these junior leaders and the United
States benefited.
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The C ontinental Army: L eadership School o f th e Early R epublic
Introduction
The soldiers who fought for their country and returned hom e to build the middle class in
the afterm ath of the Great Depression and a World W ar earned the title “Greatest Generation”
from some authors. These soldiers’ accomplishments fill num erous books. Magazines and
journals still frequently publish articles celebrating and examining their wartim e experiences and
their impact on the United States. The majority were drafted and took up arm s for only two
years-from 1943 through mid-1945. The soldiers’ rapid demobilization after World W ar II was
only one of a series of arm ed forces expansions and contractions in America’s history. These
form er military members, once they returned to work or went to college, learned new skills and
enlarged the American middle class. They were not the first group of demobilized soldiers to have
a positive impact on the growth of the United States. However, unlike the Greatest Generation,
historians have overlooked the effect of the wartim e service of Continental Army junior leaders
and their contributions to the growth of the United States.
Over half of the twenty thousand soldiers who filed for pensions between 1818 and 1832
moved from their recruitm ent locations to different states or regions in the early Republic.1Some
of them had achieved the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant, and captain before leaving the army.2
Continental Army training turned them into junior leaders who took their skills into civilian life.
Much like the biblical parable of seeds planted in good soil, the form er junior leaders bore an
abundance of good fruit when planted in their new communities. W ithout understanding the how
and why of their contributions, one cannot fully grasp the rem arkable story of the early Republic’s
rapid expansion.
The orthodox understanding of the fate of the demobilized Continental Army soldiers
holds that extended military service disadvantaged m en in their subsequent civilian lives. The

1Theodore J. Crackel, “Revolutionary W ar Pension Records and Patterns of American Mobility,
1780-1830,” Prologue 16, no. 3 (Fall 1984); John Resch, Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War
Veterans, M oral Sentim ent, and Political Culture in the Early Republic (Amherst: University of
M assachusetts Press, 1999), 218.
2 I use the term “junior officers” or “leaders” to refer to sergeants, subalterns, ensigns, lieutenants,
and captains.
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men never regained the years of service to their country and paid the price in lost wages, social
status, and m arriage opportunities until the nation belatedly and niggardly offered meager
pensions starting in 1819.3 While soldiers appreciated the delayed gratitude, the paltry pensions
scarcely made up for the lack of wages during the w ar or the paym ent in worthless Continental
dollars. Until the past twenty years, the prevailing wisdom was that most soldiers who joined the
Continental Army after 1775 did so in pursuit of the wages and were from the lowest economic
classes .4 In other words, the men entered the Army poor, and when they left they were still poor,
as well as physically and mentally broken, with little to show for their service. Almost no one got
rich serving in the Continental Army. The costs in health and personal fortune exceeded any
possible reim bursem ent from the government. Everyone from General George W ashington to the
lowest private had a tale to tell of the trem endous personal costs of serving in the Army. If the
focus rem ained on the economic costs of service, it would be easy to generalize military service as
disadvantageous to the individual. With the lost wages, health concerns, and m ental toil, it would
be hard to predict any sort of success for soldiers after the war. The evidence initially appears to
support the orthodox view.
However, cases exist that do not fit the historiography. Individuals who should have
rem ained stuck in their social station emerged as leaders in their communities. This is especially
true of junior officers and noncommissioned officers who moved from their recruitm ent locations
or hometowns. Individuals, who were supposed to be poor, broken, and distrusted by the
population due to their service in the Continental Army, emerged as respected local leaders. Local
communities elected and appointed these veterans to positions of responsibility such as sheriff,
justice of the peace, selectman, councilman, representative, and mayor. While not worthy of state
wide or national notice, these positions were essential to the formation of stable communities in
the expanding early Republic and the veterans’ contributions should be recognized.
3 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 50.
4 Edward C. Papenfuse and Gregory A. Stiverson, “General Smallwood’s Recruits: The Peacetime
Career of the Revolutionary W ar Private,” The W illiam and M ary Quarterly, Third, 30, no. 1
(January 1973): 117-132; Resch, Suffering Soldiers; John Sellers, “Military History of the
American Revolution: Proceedings of the Military History Symposium (6th)” (United States Air
Force Academy, October 10,1974). In the 1970s, the new social historians produced a
historiography of the American soldier that accurately captures the economic situation of three
regiments during various periods during the war: Maryland in 1782, New Ham pshire in 17751782, and Virginia in 1778-1781.
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The proponents of “great m an” history duly recorded the exploits of W ashington,
Hamilton, and Greene. Historians have debated the relative merits of the militia and Continental
Army and compared the strategies of W ashington and the British.s Social historians have
chronicled and explained the motivations of the average enlisted soldier and the Continental
Army as a whole, but little work has been done on the junior leaders trained by the Army and
their contributions to expanding the early Republic.6 This paper begins the overlooked story of
the m en who bridged the gap between the visions of the great men and ordinary m en who lived
with the results. These junior leaders took the lessons they learned in the Army and realized the
vision for an expansion of the new nation dream t by the founding fathers. These junior leaders
m ade the idea of a single country a reality for the early Republic. W ithout a tem plate and with
only a vision, the junior leaders employed their own ability to see the grander picture, managed,
and led their new communities, and ensured a rapid growth of states in the years after the end of
the war. Before examining their contributions to the early Republic, it is necessary to understand
how they attained their skills.
5 Russell F. Weigley, H istory o f the United States A rm y (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
Inc, 1967), 62; Russell F. Weigley, The A m erican W ay o f War: A H istory o f United States
M ilitary Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973), 4; Don
Higginbotham, The W ar o f Am erican Independence: M ilitary Attitudes, Policies, and Practice,
1763-1789 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1971), 93; Edm und S. Morgan, The Birth o f
the Republic 1763-89, Revised Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 79.
Weigley questioned the military competence of the Continental soldier. The soldier may have
been brave, but he never m easured up to the British soldier in term s of discipline and ability
because of training and equipping shortfalls. In 1971, during the height of America's involvement
in the Vietnam W ar and the success of the North Vietnamese Army's strategy against the South
Vietnamese Army, Don Higginbotham emphasized the "Peoples' War" aspect of the American
Revolution. In the afterm ath of America's experience in Vietnam, Edward S. Morgan continued
the them e of a “Peoples' W ar.”
6 Sellers, “Military History of the American Revolution,” 161,164; Charles Royster, A
Revolutionary People a t War: The Continental A rm y and Am erican Character, 1775-1783
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 373; Charles
Neimeyer, Am erica Goes to War: A Social H istory o f the Continental A rm y , 1775-1783 (New
York: New York University Press, 1996), xiv. John Sellers presented work at the Military History
Symposium in 1974 which analyzed the socio-economic backgrounds of three different
regimental-sized units and led him to declare that the soldier in the Revolutionary W ar enlisted
prim arily from the lowest rung of society for economic reasons in hopes for a better life - one they
did not achieve. In response to a question, he answered "I am not im pressed by the patriotic
fervor of the privates. I think they all acted overwhelmingly out of self-interest. I do not believe
that they really fought with a true understanding of independence." Sellers also averred that they
did not am ount to much after the w ar since they did not improve their economic standing or place
in society even though a great majority of them relocated after the war. Royster did an excellent
job of questioning the false dichotomy proposed by the proponents of enlistm ent solely for
economic reasons. Neimeyer' social history of the Continental Army argued that soldiers in the
arm y were those "least able to resist the blandishm ents of a recruiting party."
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The first question should be, how typical are these individuals of demobilized soldiers in
the early Republic? After all, someone had to be elected to serve in these community positions.
Why veteran junior leaders and not someone else? Does anything distinguish these form er
officers from their contemporaries? W ithin any group of people, some are going to attain
positions of greater trust due to natural ability, social class, or education. Did some select
individuals overcome the disadvantages of military service and succeed in spite of the trem endous
odds against them ? Are these soldiers ju st random outliers from the historically established dregs
of society who served in the Continental Army after the rage militaire passed in 1776? Or did
something in their background provide the crucial edge for electoral success? Could there be some
relationship between their military service and postwar service at the local level?
Junior leaders in the Continental Army experienced the war in a much different fashion
than the average militia m em ber or civilian who moved after the war. As officers and sergeants,
they learned to lead men in difficult circumstances for extended periods of time.7 The Army
provided training in the performance of their duties and rewarded success with prom otion and
m ore responsibility. Leaders dealt with individuals from disparate sections of the country. Their
exposure to dissimilar peoples, landscapes, and ideas vastly exceeded the experience of the
average citizen. Junior leaders with extensive experience on courts-m artial panels served as
justices of the peace in their new communities. Junior leaders with experience in establishing new
camps and bivouac sites emerged as leaders in the establishm ent and organization of new towns.
This would appear to be more than coincidence. If so obvious, why have historians not written
about the advantages of military service for veterans in the growth of the United States? Why did
previous historians overlook this issue?
Previous historians, by focusing on the senior leaders such as W ashington, Greene, and
others or on the enlisted forces as a whole, missed the advantage of military service for junior
leaders. Individual biographers or editors of diaries have noted the postwar exploits and successes
of their subjects, but no one has examined junior leaders as a cohort. Deterred by the relative

7 Jam es M artin and M ark Lender, A Respectable A rm y: The M ilitary Origins o f the Republic
1763-1789, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc, 2006), 69-77; Weigley, H istory o f
the United States A rm y, 41; Charles Knowles Bolton, The Private Soldier Under W ashington
(New York: Trow Directory, Printing and Bookbinding Company, 1902), 70.
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scarcity of sources for enlisted soldiers as a whole, historians have not leveraged the available
sources to their full potential. Reliance on pension applications and community legal records
further limited their findings and conclusions. Pension records record only the last decades of the
veterans’ lives, while town studies work only where a large sample of veterans existed in an
established community. The most recent study of Continental Army veterans focused on a rigid
community in New Ham pshire and provided the genesis for this paper. John Resch’s thorough
study of veterans from a single location contains a revelation that over half of the New England
Continental Army soldiers moved to different states or sections of the country after the war. With
a few notable exceptions due to physical or m ental injuries, social status and the control of ruling
families m ost likely had more impact on future success than service in the Continental Army
instead of the militia forces. Drawing conclusions about the disadvantages of Continental Army
service based on a New England town controlled by a few select families seems prem ature.8 The
questions posited in the previous paragraphs and discrepancies in Resch’s conclusions furnished
the impetus to further investigate the role of form er Continental Army junior leaders as they
migrated to new communities.
Military service and training equipped Continental Army junior leaders with skills critical
to their postw ar success when they moved to new communities as the nation expanded. Neither
the riffraff nor broken individuals, these junior leaders continued their contributions to the new
nation by serving their new local communities in positions of trust. The skills in leading and
m anaging people, forming bonds, and envisioning a larger vision of the United States learned
while in extended service set them apart from their contemporaries. While not leading to
economic success or riches for the individual, the expertise acquired in the Army enabled local
political success that upends the current historiography on the Continental Army soldier after the
war.

Sources & M ethodology
In order to validate the argum ent of the advantages of military service for local postwar

8 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 56. Resch’s excellent study of Peterborough, New Ham pshire focused
on one small community controlled by a few powerful families who originally founded the town a
few generations earlier.
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civilian success, the paper will examine three periods of five individuals’ lives through their
written words, extant records, and secondary sources. The five m en are familiar to Revolutionary
W ar scholars through their writings: Joseph Plumb M artin, Jerem iah Greenman, Ebenezer
Denny, Samuel Richards, and Benjamin Gilbert. They all entered military service at the lowest
enlisted ranks, and, through extended service, attained rank in the noncommissioned and
commissioned officer corps. All but one all attained positions of trust and responsibility in
locations away from their birth communities. The exception returned to his hometown and did
well after the war. Their pre-war lives, wartime experiences and training, and postwar lives are
investigated.
The paper examines the soldiers’ lives before entering the m ilitary to determ ine if pre-war
experiences and conditions provided the equivalent skills acquired during military training. For
example, were they successful businessm en, church officers, and sons of landed gentry,
experiences which taught them how to manage men and women? Social class is also examined to
speculate about their chance for advancem ent in their natal communities. The level of education
is an im portant criterion. While all were literate, what was the extent of their formal schooling?^
In eighteenth-century America, access to capital and social class standing often allowed one to
obtain positions of trust, regardless of talent or ability. As a m atter of practice, individuals with
social standing and wealth received commissions of greater rank in the Continental Army and
would not have served long, if at all, as sergeants and junior commissioned officers.10
Since military service and training forms the critical step in the argument, the process of
developing leaders in the Continental Army receives additional explanation. Once the foundation
is laid, each individual’s experience and growth are compared with contem porary standards and
the individual’s words. The United States had a difficult task in forming a professional army
capable of winning independence. After the rage militaire subsided in 1776 and militias proved
ineffective in prosecuting the war, Congress and General W ashington had to form a professional

United States. Continental Army, Regulations fo r the Order and Discipline o f the Troops o f the
United States. P a rti. (Steiner, Melchior, printer., 1779), 130. Fortunately, literacy was a criteria
for selection as a noncommissioned officer and officer.
10 Robert K. Wright, The Continental A rm y (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006),
9
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arm y to serve for the duration.11 Creating a professional Army from scratch was no easy task. The
differences between the professional British Army, the impact of Baron von Steuben’s manual,
and the strengths and weaknesses of militia m ust be understood to fully com prehend the impact
of military service and training on the chosen individuals.12 The recollections of first combat
rem ained vivid for all the individuals and provided insight into the ability to deal with chaotic
situations and persevere in their mission. All the individuals recorded impressions of good and
bad leaders that affected their own exercise of power. Their growth in understanding the leader’s
role and respect and love for the men entrusted to their care emerged from their letters and
diaries. They all experienced the need for discipline and the careful application of justice to
ensure a stable community. Campaigns took them far from their recruitm ent locations and
exposed them to the diversity of people and customs in late eighteenth-century America. The
skills in dealing with the variety of circumstances encountered while in leadership positions in the
Army proved transferable to civilian lives.
It is all the more rem arkable that skills obtained during service made success possible in
local neighborhoods when one understands that the soldiers and junior officers were not looked
upon favorably after the

w a r .J3

It is also im portant to note that contem porary civilians did not

hold the Continental Army and soldiers in great esteem. Acknowledgment of service in the Army
would not have provided easy access to positions of power and trust. Soldiers, especially
commissioned officers, were viewed with great m istrust by large swaths of the population in the
years after the w ar.^ Most civilians distrusted the idea of the “m an on horseback” and viewed

11 M artin and Lender, A Respectable A rm y; Neimeyer, Am erica Goes to War; Weigley, H istory o f
the United States A rm y; Weigley, The Am erican W ay o f War; Bruce Chadwick, The First
Am erican A rm y: The Untold Story o f George W ashington and the M en Behind A m erica’s First
Fight fo r Freedom (Naperville, Illinois: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2005). The challenges have been
documented in these and num erous other histories.
12 United States. Continental Army, Regulations. Baron von Steuben is the author of the first
version of the Regulations. Like contem porary leaders, the paper refers to the regulations
hereafter as von Steuben’s m anual for the rem ainder of the paper.
x3 Resch, Suffering Soldiers; Caroline Cox, A Proper Sense o f Honor: Service and Sacrifice in
George W ashington’s A rm y (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press,
2004). Resch and Cox both docum ent the low esteem most civilians held for Continental Army
soldiers and especially commissioned officers after the war.
Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 3,4; William Doyle, Aristocracy and Its Enemies in the Age o f
Revolution (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2009), Chap 4. “Few Americans shared Scott’s
belief that the Continental Army had won the war. Nor did most Americans share Scott’s
conviction that regular soldiers deserved special honors and reward.(3)”; They [Continental Army
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standing arm ies with suspicion. Since service alone would have not guaranteed respect and
election to positions of trust, there m ust have been something else that enabled them to overcome
the stigma of having been a soldier, and to subsequently achieve success.
In order to determ ine the ingredients for success, the selected group of postw ar lives and
records are sifted through for evidence of application of lessons learned during military service.
The records are also analyzed to see the impact of their success in destination versus natal
communities. Postwar success is not defined in term s of financial riches. Several of the
individuals suffered greatly in their economic pursuits after the war. They failed as farm ers and
m erchants or lost vast sums of money during bad business ventures. Success is defined as gaining
the trust of their associates to serve in positions of responsibility. These elected posts were not
awarded based on wealth, but trust - tru st earned through the dem onstration of skills m astered
in the Army as junior leaders.
The small num ber of sources available for investigation might initially be thought to pose
a p r o b l e m . ^ Fortunately, the targets of this inquiry required literacy for their positions. Junior
leaders had to compose reports and understand written instructions. Several of them understood
the im portance of the endeavors upon which they had embarked and proceeded to keep written
records. While noticeably sparse on issues of geopolitical strategy or long discourses on their
motivations for fighting or enlisting, they are rich with anecdotes and observations on what they
considered im portant. Even when some historians have downplayed the significance of the
memoirs or diaries as overly preoccupied with the routine and deprivation of camp life, they still
reveal keen insights into the growth and development of junior leaders. The pioneers of wom en’s
history provided a methodology to examining seemingly insignificant details along with
additional sources to provide a larger context and reveal more than was originally understood.
Diaries and memoirs composed after the fact can be criticized for the editing the author
soldiers] were no longer dangerous ‘hirelings and m ercenaries’ who posed a threat to liberty. (4);
Doyle provides an excellent recounting of the founding of the Society of Cincinnati and the
problem s the Society caused for Continental Army officers’ reputations and motives.
^A lfred Young, The Shoem aker and the Tea P a rty: M em ory and the Am erican Revolution
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1999), 7; J.Todd W hite and Charles H. Lesser, Fighters fo r
Independence: A Guide to Sources o f Biographical Inform ation On Soldiers and Sailors o f the
Am erican Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). Young states that there are at
least 500 examples of accounts of Revolutionary W ar soldiers. The guide contains approximately
500 of diaries, autobiographies, and letters of all ranks.
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undertook to cast himself in the best possible light, and thereby obscure his true feelings or
actions at the time of the event. This acknowledged weakness can be a strength for the purposes
of this exploration. One can reasonably assume authors included events they considered
im portant to their m ilitary service and growth. This assum ption becomes increasingly im portant
when the memoir is composed after the army service, when the author highlights how his army
past influenced his postwar success by accentuating events in his past that explain actions in
civilian life. Through comparing the observations in the diaries and letters with the standards of
training and education provided to Continental Army junior leaders as they assumed their duties,
the soldiers’ writings divulge interpretations previously overlooked.
Fortunately, five of the best-known soldiers’ letters and diaries of the Revolutionary W ar
were written by m en who joined as privates, received promotions, and achieved a measure of
postwar success. Other contem porary diarists, not as well known, will be occasionally referenced
to reinforce the prim ary sources or provide clarification. The best known of these writers is
Joseph Plumb M artin who joined as a private from Connecticut, served for seven years, m ustered
out as a sergeant, and served as a Maine selectman for twenty years.16Jerem iah Greenman
enlisted as a private in 1776 from Rhode Island, served eight years, became a lieutenant, and was
later elected as justice of the peace in Ohio.1? Ebenezer Denny from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, signed
up as a sailor on a privateer, later received an appointm ent to the commissioned officer ranks in
the Army, and continued in the Army after the war on the northw est frontier. Upon leaving the
service and relocating westward to Pittsburgh, Denny was elected a county commissioner,
director of the bank, and Pittsburgh’s first mayor in 1816.18 Samuel Richards enlisted in 1775
during the rage militaire and fought outside of Boston. He later reentered the Army as a
commissioned officer and served until the end of the war. Upon leaving the Army, he served as a
deacon at his local church and worked as the Postm aster General of Farmington, Connecticut, for

16 Joseph M artin, O rdinary Courage: The Revolutionary W ar A dventures o f Joseph Plumb
M artin, ed. M artin Jam es, 3rd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008), x-xii.
x? Jerem iah Greenman, D iary o f a Common Soldier in the Am erican Revolution, 1775-1783: A n
A nnotated Edition o f the M ilitary Journal o f Jerem iah Greenman, ed. Robert C. Bray and Paul E.
Bushnell (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1978), xxvii, 8.
18 Ebenezer Denny, M ilitary Journal o f M ajor Ebenezer Denny: A n Officer in the Revolutionary
and Indian Wars, vol. 7, Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Pt. 2 (Philadelphia:
J.B. Lippincott for the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, i860), 226-229.

9

over thirty years.^ Benjamin Gilbert enlisted in 1775 from Massachusetts, attained the rank of
Sergeant, and eventually appointed as a commissioned officer. He served for eight years. Gilbert
moved to western New York and served as the Otsego county sheriff for eleven years and three
term s as a New York assemblyman along with other positions in the area.20 These five individuals
dem onstrated success at the local political level after the w ar in contradiction to the long-held
image of the suffering soldier.
The m ethod for determ ining the linkage to military service as junior leaders and the
resulting postwar success is remarkably simple. The individuals’ biographical data and written
words were compared with the training and education regimes instituted by the Continental
Army, as well as postwar information on their careers. The written sources were investigated for
examples of the growth in leading and managing people, forming bonds with soldiers from
disparate parts of the country, and developing a larger, idealistic vision of the United States based
on travels while on military operations. The diary entries and letters corroborate growth and
understanding by what the soldier chose to record as im portant. With lim ited tim e and space to
record notes on paper, only the m ost im portant thoughts were saved. The thoughts that occupied
their days and minds flowed from their pens to paper. The notes served as triggers some turned
into narratives after the war. Boring and routine ideas did not m erit the effort to ensure
recollection years later. While some historians may interpret the drudgeries of camp life as
routine, an individual whose survival depended on execution of simple tasks had a different
understanding. Preoccupations with weather and guard duty change to attention on mission
accomplishment as the soldier assum ed new responsibilities. By understanding the context of
these entries at different times in their careers, one sees the development of junior leaders and
their understanding of the change in their w ritten words.

x9 Samuel Richards, “Personal Narrative of an Officer in the Revolutionary W ar,” United Service;
a Quarterly Review o f M ilitary and N aval A ffairs (1879-1905), August 1884, 200.
20 Benjamin Gilbert, W inding Down: The Revolutionary W ar Letters o f Lieutenant Benjamin
Gilbert o f M assachusetts, 1780-1783:, ed. John W. Shy (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of
Michigan Press, 1989), 101; Benjamin Gilbert, A Citizen-Soldier in the Am erican Revolution: The
D iary o f Benjamin Gilbert in M assachusetts and N ew York, ed. Rebecca D. Symmes, New York
State Historical Association Monographic Studies 2 (Cooperstown, New York: The New York
State Historical Association, 1980), 16.
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Prew ar Lives
A brief review of the soldiers’ lives before the army does not identify any m arkers of
distinction or foreshadowing of greatness. None of them was a m em ber of the upper class, but nor
were any of them destitute. Their lives before enlistm ent would not have m ade them identifiable
as deadbeats.21All received the rudim ents of an education and were literate. They had
attachm ents to their communities and extended families. They were not wage laborers looking
solely for sustenance when they originally enlisted.
Joseph Plumb M artin was only fifteen when he joined the Continental Army for the first
time. His life before enlistm ent consisted of living with his grandparents while learning to be a
farmer. He did come from respectable origins as his father was a Yale College graduate who
pastored a num ber of churches; unfortunately, none of them very successfully. M artin’s father
was constantly in dire financial straits, which is why Joseph ended up with his grandparents.22
M artin would have probably inherited his grandparents’ farm or worked as a farmer. He likely
would not have become rich given the dire prospects for farm ers in New England due to overuse
of land and dwindling plots for each succeeding generation. While he could have become a
landowner and citizen, his prospects for economic success, marriage potential, or social
advancem ent would have been limited. W hether he understood these facts is unknowable. M artin
joined the Continental Army in tim e for the campaigns around Long Island and New York City.
Jerem iah Greenman preceded M artin into the Continental Army. Greenman was
seventeen when he enlisted, but no record exists of his training for a trade. He was an only child
whose father may have made his living by the sea given his residence in Newport, Rhode Island.
Greenm an’s education was rudim entary, but it was enough for him to refine his reading and
writing in the army. The record indicates no exceptional social standing, ability, or connections
that predicted success in his birth community. It may have been for the excitement of w ar or hope
for some economic payoff to improve his prospects that Greenman decided to enlist. Greenman

21 Resch, Suffering Soldiers. Resch’s study is an excellent analysis of the socioeconomic
background of soldiers during the war that disproves the conclusions of the 1970s. Resch
identifies the Revolutionary W ar as a “peoples w ar” where all classes served in the military.
22 M artin, O rdinary Courage, vii-ix.
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joined in time for the assaults on Quebec during the w inter of 1775.23
Ebenezer Denny followed a somewhat different path into the Continental Army. Born to a
farm er south of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Denny appears to have possessed an adventurous streak.
At the age of thirteen in 1774, he secured employment carrying dispatches from Fort Pitt. After a
couple of close encounters with hostile Indians, he ended up working as a clerk in his father’s
store. From the records, Denny’s father does not appear to have been successful as a m erchant.^
Denny learned of a ship which obtained a letter of m arque and he volunteered for duty. His
position as a sailor was sim ilar to a private in the army. The captain eventually assigned him
comm and of a watch, which would have had almost identical duties to a sergeant of the guard in
any army unit. The voyage was successful, and Denny obtained a share of the prize money. Upon
return, Denny was offered a commission as an ensign in the Pennsylvania regiment. The
Pennsylvania regim ent had ju st suffered one of the more serious m utinies in 1780, and the state
was probably interested in reliable individuals. Denny’s uncle had raised a company in the early
days of the war and was killed at the battle of Crooked Billet on May 1,1778. Denny may have
been seen as a trustw orthy choice by authorities, even at the age of nineteen. In spite of his
adventures, he was not a hardened campaigner, as his initial responses to combat verified. He
came from good family, but still had to succeed by his own endeavors. He did not come from
wealth, and all his pursuits were designed to procure additional m eans for his family .25
Farmington, Connecticut, was the birthplace of Samuel Richards. Richards was twentyone when he joined one of the initial volunteer levies on May 5,1775 that departed for action
around Boston in the afterm ath of Lexington and Concord.26 By 1776, he was a commissioned
officer. Little is known of Richards’ prewar life. Articles written by his granddaughter in the late
nineteenth century acknowledge that little is known of his life before military service.2? Richards
m entioned that he grew up listening to stories of his father’s exploits during the siege of
Louisburgh in 1745 and this served as the inspiration for writing down his Revolutionary W ar

23 Greenman, Diary, xiv-xv.
Denny, M ilitary Journal o f M ajor Ebenezer D enny,7:209.
23 Ibid., 7:207-211.
26 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part I,” 202.
2? Sarah Richards Butler Woodward, “Two Connecticut Patriots,” Daughters o f the Am erican
Revolution 3, no. 4 (October 1893): 374.
24
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memories. As a twenty-one year old, he should have already chosen a profession or occupation,
but Richards never felt the need to m ention it. Securing the Postm aster General position in
Farmington indicated he leveraged military service and political patronage to obtain the job after
discharge. Nothing indicated exceptional social class, wealth, or education to predestine him for
distinguished service, had the war not come along. W ar and m ilitaiy service changed his fortunes.
W ar changed Benjamin Gilbert’s fortunes as well. Gilbert came from a family that
performed military service during the French W ars of the 1740s and 1750s. Gilbert’s father,
Daniel, completed his service as a junior officer. While Benjamin’s father was a selectman during
the initial hostilities with Great Britain, his prim ary occupation was farming. Benjamin Gilbert’s
prim ary school education was elem entary and he, like Greenman, was self-taught. Gilbert,
nineteen years old, enlisted as a private in 1775 and marched off to Boston.28 Gilbert initially
served as a private and sergeant for over four years before obtaining a commission as an officer in
August 178o .29 Gilbert enjoyed drinking and consorting with prostitutes a bit too much and had
some difficulty in making the transition from enlisted to commissioned officer^0 His diary as an
enlisted m an reveals someone who enjoyed th e pleasures of the flesh and bottle and held little
potential for distinguished service. His com m anders did trust him with im portant posts, such as
quarterm aster of the company. His success as the supply sergeant evidently put him in good stead
with his com m ander when the tim e for letters of recom mendation for prom otion to the officer
ranks arrived. Even so, Gilbert took alm ost twice as long as Greenman to make the leap from
sergeant to ensign. While w ar quickly m atured Greenman in the eyes of his leaders, Gilbert took
longer. Greenm an’s exposure to m ore combat and captivity than Gilbert probably accelerated the
process.
W ar changed individuals. That tru th has not changed in the millennia of hum an history.
The ill-effects included bodily harm , m ental traum a, and post-traum atic stress disorder (PTSD),
to nam e only a few. Combat also subjected individuals to stressful situations, and when survived,
infused the person with newfound confidence in their abilities and potential. W hen lessons

28 Gilbert, W inding Down, 10-11.
29 Ibid., 19.
3 ° Ibid., 87. Gilbert's whoring and drinking are referenced in the letters he wrote to a friend on
March 1,1783.
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instilled by the Army resulted in the tangible benefit of surviving battle and accomplishing the
mission, an individual learned to trust his training and education. While fear rem ained present,
individuals performed when others m ight have hesitated or panicked. New, uncertain situations
did not create the same trepidation or intim idation as they might have done previously. The
individual’s comfort zone increased. In regard to these men, this expanded comfort zone later
enabled them to migrate to new communities with new people, integrate into the fabric of society,
and establish relationships. Since the new neighborhoods would not have the same hardened
social structures as established communities on the eastern seaboard, the junior leader’s
opportunity to put his training to use worked to allow him to gain positions of tru st based on skill
and merit. Confidence in new abilities did not come solely from reading a m anual or instruction. 3 1
Developing junior leaders required the combination of experience and training.

First E xposure to Combat
W hen tracking leader development in the written records, it is particularly im portant to
note how the soldiers recorded their reactions to their first exposure to combat and how they
m atured over the period of their service. Chronology was im portant because all the men
experienced combat before they received any training on leadership. In most cases, formal
training occurred two years after they joined. After they underw ent instruction, their memoirs
show an appreciation and application of their lessons.
W ith only two exceptions, the diaries and letters used underw ent some editing before
dissem ination to family members or publication. 32 The incidents recalled and rem aining in the
accounts were im portant to the individual. Even events that at first glance might seem
em barrassing to the casual reader serve as starting point for finding the author's growth as a
soldier. The junior leaders knew they had changed over time and wrote about these incidents. The
soldiers saw them as formative events in their lives and service. The study will analyze these
initial exposures to combat and the lessons that the author either learned or w anted to pass on to
his family and friends once the work was published.

A Proper Sense o f Honor, 44. “Reading about army life was not going to train the army.
Rather, living the Army life would have to do it.”
3 2 Jerem iah Greenman and Benjamin Gilbert’s letters have survived unedited.
3 1 Cox,
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Understandably, an individual's first experience in combat varied. Common reactions
involved terror and

fe a r.3 3

Thankfulness for survival and attributing their safety to divine

protection were other common

r e a c t io n s .3 4

Tracking reactions and recording of the individuals'

first exposure to combat for leader development makes it possible to plot their growth over
subsequent campaigns and years. The crucial aspect is to understand how each individual
rem embered and viewed his own initial combat experience, and not how another may have
viewed his composure. Another party may have viewed an him as uncaring, disinterested, or calm
under pressure, when in fact, the individual may have been terrified, but m aintained the
necessary composure because of training and experience and to inspire courage in his
subordinates. Leading individuals during stressful times required the ability to instill confidence.
How an individual learned this lesson can be understood by examining the record of his first
exposure to combat and how good leaders acted in subsequent entries.
M artin's diary contained one of the more fully developed and chronological accounts of
the growth and development of an individual's leadership skills and experience. M artin
acknowledged the start of his growth as. a leader during the New York campaign when he recorded
his first recognition as a "man" by an officer. M artin's unit landed at Brooklyn and was marching
towards the battle when he encountered wounded men for the first time and started to feel fear.
Another soldier then started complaining about being thirsty to an officer when M artin recounted
what the officer said. "‘Look at that m an,’ said he, pointing to me, ‘he is not thirsty, I will w arrant
it.’ I felt a little elated to be styled a

m a n . "35

Being recognized as a man by someone in authority

during a time of danger m ade an impression on M artin. M artin recorded this entry as his m arker

33 Ebenezer Fletcher, The N arrative o f Ebenezer Fletcher, a Soldier o f the Revolution, ed. Charles
I. Bushnell (New York,: Priv. print., 1866), 14. " The enemy pursued our men in great haste. Some
of them came over the log where I lay. Some came so near I could almost touch them . I was not
discovered by the enemy till the battle was over. W hen they were picking up the dead and
wounded among the brush and logs, I heard them coming towards me, and began to be much
terrified, lest I should be found."
34 Samuel A. Green, Three M ilitary Diaries Kept by Groton Soldiers in Different Wars; (Groton,
Mass.: J. Wilson and Son, 1901), 84. "Monday tus wedens May 8. 9 & 10 days Etended Prayers
M orning And night there was Several gons Discharged about this time Kiled one or two others
Escaping narraly Blesed Be God that my life is Preserved" All quotations are rendered as recorded
for the rem ainder of the paper.
35 Joseph Plumb M artin, A N arrative o f Some o f the Adventures, Dangers and Sufferings o f a
Revolutionary Soldier; Interspersed with Anecdotes o f Incidents That Occurred w ithin His Own
Observation (Hallowell Me.: Printed by Glazier Masters & Co., 1830), 19.
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as to when he stopped being a boy and m atured into an adult.
Later in the battle, M artin saw his first example of poor leadership, and it rem ained with
him for 50 years. A lieutenant ran around his soldiers in fear, sniveling, blubbering, and asking
for forgiveness from his m en for any wrong doings he may have committed. M artin was disgusted
with the performance. As he noted: "A fine soldier you are, I thought, an exemplary m an for
young soldiers! I would have then suffered anything short of death than have made such an
exhibition of myself...." 36 M artin internalized this lesson about the proper composure for a leader.
M artin did not fault the officer for being afraid. He was critical in the way he showed it and the
effect it had on his soldiers. M artin himself recorded that even though he had to retreat very
quickly when in danger of being overrun by superior forces, he m aintained his composure.
Some of our m en at this tim e seemed to think that they could never run fast or far
enough. I never wanted to run, if I was forced to run, further than to be beyond the reach
of the enemy's shot, after which I had no more fear of their overtaking me than I should
have of an arm y of lobsters doing, unless it were their horsem en, and they dared not do
it. [italics in o r ig in a l]3 7
Similar to M artin, Jerem iah Greenman initially enlisted at a young age as a private early
in the war. His first m ajor campaign was the disastrous assault on Quebec. Greenman breached
the walls of Quebec, but he was trapped inside when the rem ainder of the Continental Army fled
after the death of General Montgomery. His first exposure to combat introduced him to heroism
and cowardice. Greenman did not run and the British took him prisoner and he spent the next ten
m onths in captivity.3 8
Ten m onths of captivity m atured Greenman far beyond his eighteen years. He saw
num erous men die from sickness, felt despondent, tried to escape, learned how to keep men's
hope alive, and learned what to expect from

l e a d e r s . 39 After

a prisoner exchange, Greenman

becam e a First Sergeant within two years. Greenman's promotions suggested ability; past

36 Ibid., 20.
37 Ibid., 54.
3 8 Greenman, Diary, 23,32.
39 Ibid., 26,27 & 2 9 - "the officer come in went down Seller asked what we was a cutting the ice
from that door for / we told him we did not know / Neither did we know who it was but thay
m istrust'd that we was agoing to try to git out but that did not know "(p.26); "May 1776 S26 to
F31. Continue in prison / hear we live very discontented and quite out of hope of ever being reliv’d
but keep up our hearts all we can" (p. 27); "June M17 to S30...we are put off from one day to
another and next week but we keep our hearts up all we can for our cituasion for we are very
unhealthey by keeping us in such a hole not fit for dogs much m ore for men." (p. 29).
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performance resulted in his promotion to Sergeant for his next enlistm ent and led to his
appointm ent as First Sergeant/W ithout evidence of other factors such as patronage, wealth, or
social status, the officers in Greenman's unit noticed both the effect he had on the soldiers and his
past performance, and prom oted him into positions of greater responsibility^0
Greenman's m aturity and transform ation can be tracked by the content of his entries
between Septem ber 1775 and March of 1776. Greenman's diaiy begins by noting the day-to-day
activities of a soldier.41These types of entries continued for seven m onths until the third m onth of
captivity. Beginning in March 1776, his entries started to comment on items such as policies,
events of greater significance than his im m ediate surroundings, and behavior of the leaders.
Greenman clearly began to think about and see the military situation in a larger context than just
its imm ediate effects on him.42 He learned what good leaders need to do to take care of men in
stressful situations. This knowledge would have been invaluable while serving as justice of the
peace in Ohio in 1806.
During his first exposure to combat as a young officer, Ebenezer Denny experienced
combat unlike anything he saw during his naval exploits. He noted that the initial sight of battle
sickened

h im .4 3

His first time in combat as an officer almost ended in disaster when he came close

to passing out from dehydration. Lieutenant Denny survived his first encounter in a skirmish near
W illiamsburg and took part in the final assault on Yorktown’s d e f e n s e s .4 4

4° Ibid., 104. The editors, Robert Bray and Paul Bushnell, opine that Greenman owed “his advance
through the ranks as much as steadfastness as to anything else.” They base this assessm ent on his
being relied upon to take his unit to retrieve the majority of the Rhode Island regim ent which
m utinied in 1779: “informed me th at the biger part of the Regement had tu rn ’d out in M uterny / I
received orders to m arch with my m en to camp all except 3 which was {to} keep Guad. / I then
pushed on for camp as fast as possible ware I arrived about 4 oclock ware I joined my party to
sum m ore Capt. H um phry had. / then m archt in persuit of the M utiners which had m archt off for
Greenwich to take a m an from the Guad that was under Sentince of Death for M uterny”
41 Ibid., 15, 22, and 25. S7. Set out this m orn very early / came 7 milds (p.15); S9. a pleasant morn
but Cule / in the after noon there was orders given for 440 men to be in readiness (p. 22); F 16 to
T 29 very Cold indeed / we git sum wheat that is [in] bags below ware we go after wood and burn
it wich m akith very good Coffe and selling sum of our thing we git sum money & so we have once
in a wile sums Caffe (p. 25).
42 Ibid., 26,27,29 and 30.
43 Denny, M ilitary Journal o f M ajor Ebenezer D enny, 7:240. "Here for the first tim e saw
wounded men; Feelings not very agreeable; endeavor to conquer this disposition or weakness; the
site sickened me."
44 Ibid., 7:241. “My captain, Montgomery, received a shot in his foot and had hopped back in the
rear; Lieutenant Bluer being absent, the charge of the company devolved on me; young and
inexperienced, exhausted with hunger and fatigue, had like to have disgraced m yself-had eat
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The content of the entries in his diary illustrate Denny's transform ation from a terrified
young m an in his first skirmish to a seasoned officer. Denny's real m aturity and leadership growth
took place when his unit m arched to South Carolina, where he spent the next fourteen m onths
outside of Charleston. He impressed the right individuals through his competence. He even made
note of dining with General Nathaniel Green. Denny took command of separate units for foraging
missions and witnessed the reduction of his Pennsylvania regim ent through

i l l n e s s . 45

Denny

exercised good leadership skills while serving in a climate inhospitable for Pennsylvania soldiers
who lacked adequate supplies. Denny's account m ade note of his concern for the care and feeding
of his men:
Our camp very thin; not more than three relieves of officers and m en for the ordinary
duties. Hospitals crowded, and great m any sick in camp; deaths so frequent, the funeral
ceremony dispensed with. Provisions scarce and very indifferent; the beef brought from
the back counties of North Carolina, by the tim e they reach the camp, poor indeed, and
m ust be unwholesome A6
This entry correlated closely with the lessons von Steuben wrote in his m anual on the officer’s
responsibility to care for his men in all m atters.47
Like M artin, Samuel Richards was also present at the battle of Long Island and
experienced the fear and confusion of the battlefield sim ilar to M artin's recollections. Richards
was a subaltern during the Battle of Long Island. 4 8 He noted the confusion of the battle and the
disregard for the accepted conduct of the laws of w ar by the British regulars in bayoneting the
wounded: "..., yet the scenes of this memorable day was so complicated that enough rem ains to be
told occupy an inquisitive mind. No m ention being made of the wounded, it is presum ed that they
were dispatched by the bayonet. No one unused to such scenes can form any ju st idea of the
confused and mixed scenes of that day. "49 Richards let his family know that unless one
experienced combat, it was extremely difficult to convey in words the chaos, complexity, and
horror. The experience had a lasting effect on him and his development as a leader.
nothing all day but a few blackberries-w as faint, and with difficulty kept my place; once or twice
was about to throw away my arm s (a very heavy espontoon).”
45 Ibid., 7:253. "Pennsylvanians have been reduced, by deaths, desertions, &c., and were now
incorporated into one regim ent of six hundred men."
46 Ibid., 7:251.
47 United States. Continental Army, Regulations, 139.
4 8 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part I,” 209.
49 Ibid., 218.
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His m em oir recounted his development as a soldier and officer accustomed to the rigors
of combat. With a certain sangfroid he notes, "One night a ball passed thro' my apartm ent in the
barrack, a few feet over me as I lay in my berth. Such things having become common, we thought
little of them ." 5° Richards’ growing m aturity as a leader led him to recognize that there are some
things one can control in w ar and some things one cannot. He let the reader know there is no use
worrying over them .
Richards’ diary contained an account for his family to dem onstrate he was brave in battle,
but not foolish. His account m entions the feelings of patriotism and desire to be tested in battle
during the siege of Boston in 1775. After participating in num erous campaigns, he displayed the
wisdom and m aturity of a leader. This is his account of his conduct during one engagement:
The soldier well knows th at when the smoke from the muzzle of the vent of the gun is
seen in the same line with him self the piece points directly at him. I recollect that, seeing
the flash of the discharge of a gun, the smoke from the muzzle and vent being in line with
me, I stepped behind a tree while the grape passed, one of which I noticed struck the tree.
Those being the only passes through which the enemy could approach directly, and our
force so posted was viewed sufficient to defend them , both bodies rem ained in that
position until the night of the 26th.51
Richards moved and hid behind a tree when the enemy fired. A less seasoned leader might have
been afraid of showing cowardice in front of his men. Richards was sure enough of his conduct,
growth, and performance as a leader to record this episode for his family. Creating and remaining
in form ation was an im portant part of eighteenth-century tactics. For a leader to break formation
could be a serious issue. This is why Richards immediately followed his account of the episode
with a sentence to ensure his family knew he did not run and was not a coward. He rem ained with
his unit in position and performed his duty. Richards’ diary contained episodes highlighting the
author’s satisfaction at having perform ed as befitted an officer after less than a year as an enlisted
m an. Richards quickly made the transition to the officer ranks and his own recollections record
satisfactory service without presenting him self as a hero.
As m entioned earlier, Benjamin Gilbert enlisted as a private and m ade sergeant during
his first four years in the Army. Gilbert did not record his first impressions of combat while an
enlisted soldier. This could have been due to the absence of m ajor battles in his unit’s area of
5° Ibid., 209.
s1Ibid., 217.
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operation. Later as a newly commissioned officer in 1780, two letters written alm ost ten m onths
apart displayed Gilbert’s growth as a leader. The first letter, written to his family after being back
in the army only six weeks as a commissioned officer, recorded his frustration with his duties. As
a commissioned officer, his leadership responsibilities should have increased. Instead, he found
his duties remarkably sim ilar to the ones he left behind as a sergeant. He contem plated resigning
and leaving the army:
As soon as I am sertain that the rem aining Regiments will not be filled with m en for the
W ar I shall leave the Army immediately, for I am determined not to be a drill Sergeant
allways. Ever since I came to camp I have ben up at day-brake disciplining the levies and
every afternoon when off duty on the same or Business. As soon as they are learned their
times are out we m ust take new ones th at makes us perpettual slaves.s2
Another letter written ten m onths later extolled the army’s success and lauded the
soldiers’ bravery: "Our arm y being at that tim e from Eight to fifteen miles from the field of action,
no imm ediate support could be lent them , but they m aintaining their groung with unexampled
Braverey, kept the Enemy at such a distance, as gave time for six hundred of Pensilvania line to
come to their a s s i s t a n c e . "53 This is the same series of skirmishes around W illiamsburg in which
Denny first tasted combat. Lieutenant Gilbert evidently learned how to motivate and direct his
troops in combat, which is a fundam ental part of leadership well dem onstrated by the soldiers'
performance. Gilbert went from a petulant junior officer complaining about his soldiers to a
m ature leader extolling their bravery to his family.

Forging Leaders
While im portant, combat experience alone is insufficient to forge a junior leader into one
who can transfer hard-earned skills to civilian pursuits. Even though some individuals are born
leaders, the vast majority requires instruction to be successful. The United States did not possess
a noble class that provided leaders for the newly formed Continental Army. Although initially
enam ored with the idea of citizen-soldiers formed into militia units, General W ashington and
congressional leaders eventually understood independence required a professional army to
prosecute the war. The British Army used the sons of nobility to populate its junior officer corps

s2 Gilbert, W inding Down, 25.
53 Ibid., 46.
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and developed sergeants through a process of on-the-job training for ten

y e a r s . 54 The

Continental

Army could not exercise either of these options. It did not have a pool of noble sons nor the tim e
to grow sergeants. A large pool of form er professional soldiers also did not exist from which to
draw. The army would have to teach junior officers quickly through a combination of training,
education, and experience.
Continental Army leaders with previous British Army service knew the shortfalls of the
Continental Army. Short term s of service as provincial soldiers during the Seven Years W ar
provided only a rudim entary foundation on which to produce an army’s l e a d e r s . 55 The challenge
was educating junior leaders fast enough in the face of expiring enlistments, combat losses, and
extended maneuvers. Pamphlets and m anuals existed for m aneuver tactics, siege warfare, or
logistics, but leadership development was noticeably absents6 The sons of nobles were expected
to have learned the art of command from father figures and other male nobles. Military m anuals
treated the art of command as a requirem ent before attem pting to m aster the science of war.
Merely studying w ar in a book proved insufficient to bridge the distance between novice and
practitioner. The Continental Army comm anders did not bridge the gap until two and half years
54 Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in Am erica: A Social H istory o f M ilitary Life in the
Revolutionary Period (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 23, 97. The average age of the
British soldier in the Army when he joined was twenty. The average infantrym an had ten years of
service. He was part of a group of men who had lived, trained, and campaigned together for years,
which in turn created an extremely strong bond of kinship. The m en’s imm ediate leaders, the
noncommissioned officers, were predom inantly prom oted from within the ranks after many years
of service. Although commissioned officers were responsible for the training of their men, the
class-conscious officers found it demeaning and boring, and NCOs conducted the real training.
55 Virginia Steele, “George W ashington’s Military M anuals” (Library of Congress, 2010); John
Womack Wright, Som e Notes on the Continental A rm y. (Cornwallville, N. Y.,: Hope Farm Press],
1963). The most comprehensive list of W ashington's Military Manuals is contained in a document
prepared by the Library of Congress. W right's Som e N otes on the Continental A rm y is another
good source. Numerous leaders tried to bridge the gaps in their knowledge by obtaining books on
military science.
s6 Thomas Simes, The M ilitary Guide fo r Young Officers, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: J. Humphrey, R.
Bell, and R. Aitken, 1776); Thomas Webb, A M ilitary Treatise on the A ppointm ents o f the A rm y
Containing M a n y Useful H ints, N o t Touched upon before by A n y Author: A n d Proposing Some
N ew Regulations in the A rm y, Which Will Be Particularly Useful in Carrying on the W ar in
North-Am erica: Together with A Short Treatise on M ilitary Honors (Philadelphia: Printed by W.
Dunlap, 1759); William Young, The Practice o f Manoeuvring a Battalion o f Infantry. B y William
Young, Late M ajor o f Brigade to the Corps o f Grenadiers and Highlanders Who Served in
Germany, and N o w in the Service o f Brunswick. (London: Printed for J. Millan near Whitehall,
1771). The technical aspect of some of the m anuals was very informative and practical such as
Young's Maneuvers which contained detailed explanations and the use of terrain boards and map
exercises that would be familiar to current soldiers. Others such as Simes' The M ilitary Guide fo r
Young Officers or Webb's A Treatise on the A ppointm ents o f the A rm y contained more theory
and maxims supported by examples from antiquity and more recent European campaigns.
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later during the winter encam pm ent from 1777-1778 at Valley Forge when Baron von Steuben
wrote, disseminated, and personally taught his m anual to junior leaders.
It would be hard to over-estimate the importance of von Steuben’s m anual on the
professionalization of the Continental Army. Most regard it as a drill m anual that allowed the
American soldiers to compete with the British soldiers on the battlefield using sim ilar tactics. In
fact, it did accomplish this task as dem onstrated at the subsequent Battle of M onmouth in June
1778. More importantly, the m anual provided instructions to junior leaders on their
responsibilities and duties.57 In addition to required qualifications, the m anual identified the
traits and habits of junior leaders at every level, s8 Promotion was not based on social status,
popularity, or seniority but on ability and dem onstrated proficiency. The junior leader ranks
became a meritocracy and broke with provincial or militia traditions.
Learning the m anual was the educational portion of junior leader development. The
repetition of drill and m anual of arm s constituted the training portion of the leader’s growth. The
junior leaders m astered a task and then had to teach new recruits from all areas of the country

57 United States. Continental Army, Regulations. Baron von Steuben's m anual was not entirely
new creation. Several passages were condensed versions of previous published works.
Instructions for Captains and Lieutenants can be found in Simes, Thomas. The M ilitary Guide fo r
Young Officers. However, duties for noncommissioned officers are missing.
58 Ibid. United States. Continental Army, Regulations. "A captain cannot be too careful of the
company the state has comm itted to his charge. He m ust pay the greatest attention to the health
of his men, their discipline, arms, accoutrem ents, ammunition, clothes and necessaries. His first
object should be, to gain the love of his men, by treating them with every possible kindness and
hum anity, enquiring into their complaints, and well founded, seeing them redressed. He should
know every m an of his company by nam e and character (p. 138)”. For Lieutenant, "He should
endeavor to gain the love of his men, by attention to everything which may contribute to their
health and convenience. He should often visit them at different hours; inspect into their m anner
of living; see that their provisions are good and well cooked, and as far as possible oblige them to
take their meals at regulated hours. He should pay attention to their complaints, and when well
founded, endeavor to get them redressed; but discourage them from complaining on every
frivolous occasion (p. 141)." First Sergeant, "The soldier having acquired that degree of confidence
of his officers as to be appointed first sergeant of the company, Should consider the importance of
his office; that the discipline of the company, the conduct of the men, their exactness and obeying
orders, and the regularity of their m anners, will integrate m easure depend on his vigilance. He
should be intimately acquainted with the character of every soldier of the company, and should
take great pains to impress upon their m inds the indispensable necessity of the strictest
obedience, as the foundation of order and regularity (p. 145).” Sergeants and corporals. " It being
on the noncommissioned officers that the discipline and order of a company and a great measure
depends, they cannot be too circumspect in their behavior towards the men, by treating them with
mildness, and at the same tim e obliging everyone to do his duty. By avoiding two great familiarity
with the men, they will not only gain their love and confidence, but they traded with a proper
respect; whereas by a contrary conduct they forfeit all regard, in their authority becomes despised
(p. 148).”
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and differing educational levels. Much like a craftsm an teaching an apprentice, junior leaders had
to instill discipline and a response to commands to ensure survival on and off the battlefield. The
junior leaders learned how to use fear, instill respect, disperse praise and adm inister justice to
train and lead their charges. Especially for sergeants, intim idation could only be a short-term
leadership tactic. Day-to-day interaction required m ore than ju st barking orders. Several different
approaches were needed to deal with different situations. Not all sergeants succeeded, but the
ones who learned adaptability flourished. Familiarity with hum an nature in stressful situations
would have given these junior leaders an advantage, especially for those individuals who executed
the duties of justice of the peace or sheriff, in dealing with civilians in new
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memoirs w ritten during and after the w ar by the chosen individuals dem onstrated the importance
of von Steuben’s lessons and their effect on their future lives.
M artin was still a private at Valley Forge and was part of the initial training base for the
newly trained forces. As M artin recorded, "After I joined my regim ent I was kept constantly, when
off other duty, engaged in learning the Baron de Steuben's new Prussian exercise; it was a
continual drill."60 M artin learned his lessons well and made sergeant a couple of years later.61
M artin achieved fame with historians due to his ability to tell a good story about his experiences,
but the highest rank he achieved was sergeant late in the w ar due to his young age. M artin was
only twenty when appointed a sergeant in the Corps of Miners and the war essentially ended
within the year.
Although Greenman was only a few years older than M artin when he enlisted, he was also
very perceptive observer of hum an nature. These two facts allowed him to achieve rank faster
than M artin. W hen Greenman received instruction personally from Baron von Steuben on drill

59 Ibid., 142. Junior leaders m astered listening to the soldiers and deciding how to handle
problems. Elected officials required the same talents when dealing with constituents. This
instruction is directed at lieutenants: “He should pay attention to their complaints, and when
well-founded, endeavor to get them redressed; but discourage them from complaining on every
frivolous occasion.”
60 M artin, A N arrative, 86.
61 Ibid., 140. "All the officers were required to be acquainted with the sciences, and it was
desirable to have as intelligent young m en as could be procured to compose it, although some of
us fell considerably short of perfection. Agreeable to the arrangem ent between my form er
com m ander and my new captain, I was appointed a sergeant in this corps, which was as high an
office I ever obtained in the army; and I had some doubts in my own m ind at the tim e w hether I
was altogether qualified for that."
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and command later in his enlistm ent, he recognized the im portance of what von Steuben wrote.62
While historians know that Continental Army officers attem pted to make up for deficiencies in
military science through their book purchases, Greenman’s diary contained entries on the actual
reading of military m anuals to increase his professional knowledge.^ Entries in this part of the
diary contain m ore fully formed thoughts, as well as observations on m ore consequential m atters
than the weather and hunger. It is clear Greenman improved his literacy skills as he progressed
through the ranks. His entries also highlight his growth and m aturity as a com m ander of men.
Denny does not specifically m ention any formal education as a soldier, while Gilbert’s
letters and diaiy contain information on his education and training of soldiers. Denny received
his commission rather late in the war in August 1780 just in tim e for Yorktown .64 He briefly
m entions that he received some on-the-job instruction from his company com m ander as he
deployed his soldiers for battle. “My captain (Montgomery) fell behind his company where my
place was, talked with me; gives me a lesson useful to m e.”6s This is Denny’s sole m ention of any
training or instruction in his memoirs. While Denny did not receive instruction from von Steuben,
he knew of his impact on the Army.66 He evidently was familiar with von Steuben’s m anual since
his preferred duty was as an adjutant, and his observations conformed to the duties and
responsibilities of a junior leader.6?
Richards’ unit wintered in the Highlands and West Point between 1777-1778 and partook
in von Steuben’s training later in the year.68 Richards commanded a select unit of 200 soldiers to
receive training from one of von Steuben’s disciples .69 Richards may have received some on-the-

62 Greenman, Diary, 134,139. “April 1779, S4 to T22 ...we exercise the prusan way left of the
64th. intirely..” and “Septem ber 1779 S5 ...order’d to see our mens arm cleen to m arch in the
m orn to be reviewed by Barron Stuban, a M ajor Genl. Who hold the rank of inspector Genl. Of the
American army / he is prusan / first brought the prusan Exercise into our arm y”
63 Ibid., 210. “(June 1781) “F8 Continuing at my quarters / the forepart of the day in reading
Military Instruction for officers... S9 Spent the forenoon in reading Military Instruction”
64 Denny, M ilitary Journal o f M ajor Ebenezer D enny, 7:237.
65 Ibid., 7:240.
66 Ibid., 7:243. “Baron Steuben, our great military oracle.”
6? Ibid., 7:255. 255 “Exercised often; perform the parade duties in absence of the adjutant - very
fond of this.” The m anual explained in great detail the responsibilities of the adjutant for drill and
ceremonies.
68 Samuel Richards, “Personal Narrative of an Officer in the Revolutionary W ar Part II,” United
Service; a Quarterly Review o f M ilitary and N aval Affairs (1879-1905), September 1884, 277.
69 Ibid., 279. “Baron Steuben having arrived in the country to introduce into our army the
Prussian discipline, a French officer was sent from him on to the Point, and two hundred men
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job training from one other well-known individual. He shared quarters with Thaddeus Kosciusko
and accompanied him on surveys J° The only clues to his knowledge of the requirem ents for his
position are the num erous entries that could serve as examples for von Steuben’s traits.?1The
entries are often inserted with little regard for the flow of the narrative. Even though they were
not germ ane to the story he was telling, they were im portant enough that he wanted his son to
know how he acted in accordance with the expectations of a commissioned officer and did not
abuse his position. W hen he wrote, he also wanted to challenge the prevailing feeling that
commissioned officers were trying to create a new aristocracy by their demands for pensions in
the afterm ath of the war. Richards was a charter m em ber of the Society of Cincinnati and worked
faithfully to obtain pensions for soldiers in later years.?2
Like Richards, Benjamin Gilbert’s regim ent spent the w inter of 1777-1778 quartered along
the Hudson River in New York, and therefore did not partake of von Steuben’s drill exercises at
Valley Forge .?3 His regim ent does not seem to have acquired the new m anuals until late spring
1778.74 Gilbert was quite a bit older than M artin and Greenman, but much more im m ature at the
time. At the age of twenty four, his diary contains num erous entries such as, “Got back to camp
Ju st before sunrise and meeting again at 8 ocClock we kept up a Drinking all Day.”?s Most
m entions of other sergeants contain references to drinking grog with them . His first term of
service expired January 17,1780.76 While Gilbert left the Army as a sergeant, his diary contains
num erous references to fraternizing with officers to include his company commander, Captain
were selected to pass through the exercises as a model, of which I had the command, and two days
in the week we used to go through the exercises, with maneuvering and firing.”
?° Ibid., 278.
71 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part I,” 210. “Readers of History generally seem to be looking for
descriptions of bloody battles and counting the num ber of killed and wounded, but the real
philanthrophist m ust experience a higher gratification in contem plating a series of firm, prudent,
and judicious arrangem ents tending to effect a great object without one of those sanguinary
conflicts which so strongly interest the feelings of most readers.” The previous entry exemplifies
the im portance von Steuben placed on accomplishing the routine duties on page 142 of his
m anual. Richards entry on helping a wounded comrade served as an example for von Steuben’s
adm onition to care for the wounded on page 139: “The attachm ent th at arises from this kind of
attention to the sick and the wounded, is alm ost inconceivable; it will moreover be the means of
preserving the lives of many valuable m en.”
?2 Samuel Richards, “Samuel Richards Papers” (Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford,
Connecticut, 1828 1818), MS 101392.
?3 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 46.
74 Ibid., 32. (June, 1778) “the 8th ‘Our Regt. learnt the New exercise. ”
75 Ibid., 59.
?6 Ibid., 63.
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Daniel Shays.77 While his diary entries do not leave the reader with the impression of diligence, he
evidently im pressed his officers, which is why he was able to obtain a commission as an officer
later in the year on February 21,1780.78 Gilbert’s sole reference to self-improvement came when
he noted borrowing a book on geography from a fellow

o f f i c e r .79

Map reading and terrain

appreciation were indispensable skills for a commissioned officer. Gilbert evidently recognized his
deficiency and undertook to correct it.
Dem onstrating abilities to manage people, adm inister justice, form bonds, and
understand the larger reality of the U nited States made veteran junior leaders attractive
candidates for local elected office and public trust. The m en in this study recorded events

.

confirming their proficiency at these tasks. Even if they understood the importance of these skills
before joining the army, continued service in the army m ade them extremely competent.
Continued service in the Continental Army is the im portant variable, which sets these m en apart
from their comrades in the militia. The Continental Army soldiers gained wisdom during the long
periods in the field, before and after the battle, when the militias and short-term enlistees were
absent. Citizen-soldiers in the militia generally fought for much shorter periods, near home, and
with neighbors and kinfolk. Although combat in any form affects an individual, substantive
leadership changes take place over longer periods than possible in a battle or maneuvers. The
Continental Army soldiers experienced long-term exposure to discipline, deprivation, and
poverty, sustained in a unique environm ent where the transform ation occurred.80 The diaries of
our soldiers provide ample evidence of this hard-earned and practiced wisdom.
Successful leaders learn how to lead people and manage resources, and Continental Army
soldiers were no exception. Soldiers recognized good and bad leadership and noted it in their
diaries and letters.81 M artin was an especially prolific writer on good and bad leadership examples

77 This is the same Shays of Shays Rebellion in 1786.
78 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 65.
79 Ibid., 66.
80 M artin a n d Lender, A Respectable A rm y, 69-77; Bolton, The Private Soldier Under
W ashington, 70.
81 Samuel Bixby, Sergeant Sam uel Bixby D iary (Worcester, MA: American Antiquarian Society,
n.d.), 295. "Col. David Brewer was tried by a Court Martial, for giving his son, 16 years of age, a
commission, and drawing the pay for him for the m onth of August, while the inexperienced lad
was at home in his own service. Also, for sending two soldiers belonging to his Regiment to work
on his farm! The Court ordered the said David Brewer to be dismissed the service. Amen to th at.”
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he observed. W hether the steadfast com m ander in combat, the selfish lieutenants who looked
after their own needs before their own soldiers’, the drunken officers along the line of march, or in
any other episodes, M artin was sure to portray them in term s the average citizen could
understand.82 He also included an assessm ent of his own conduct to show he had learned how a
good leader acted . 83 One of the more profound examples M artin recorded toward the end of his
first enlistm ent involved an aide de camp who made a rash judgm ent without gathering all the
facts. M artin knew what the appropriate actions should have been, and he implied the aide de
camp should have known as well. M artin recorded for his readers the im portance he placed on
protecting his fellow soldiers, and by extension, his neighbors when he was in public service.
A sergeant was accused by an aide-de-camp of deserting his post when he was in fact
carrying out the orders of his superior officer to procure additional amm unition in the midst of
the battle .84 The aide-de-camp drew his sword and ordered the sergeant back to his unit. The
sergeant then cocked and pointed his m usket at the officer and told him he was going to follow his
officer's orders. The sergeant was subdued and sentenced for execution. W hen he was brought
before the troops for execution, a last m inute stay was issued. The planned execution had not
been well received by the Connecticut troops. As M artin recorded, "But the Sergeant was
reprieved, and I believe it was well that he was, for his blood would have not been the only blood
82 M artin, A Narrative, 92,107.. "The officer who commanded the platoon that I belonged to was
a captain, belonging to the Rhode Island troops, and a fine brave m an he was; he feared nobody
nor nothing. W hen we were paraded, ‘Now,’ he said to us, ‘you have been wishing for some days
past to come up with the British, you have been wanting to fight. Now you shall have fighting
enough before the night.’ The m en did not need much haranguing to raise their courage, for when
the officers came to order the sick and lame to stay behind as guards, they were forced to exercise
their authority to the full extent before they could make even the invalid stay behind, and when
some of their arms were about to be exchanged with those who were going into the field, they
would not part with them. ‘If their arm s w ent,’ they said, ‘they would go with them at all events (p.
92).’” "Some of the other officers who had not dipped their bills quite so deep parted them, at the
same tim e representing to them the ridiculous situation they stood in, fighting like blackguards in
sight of the soldiers (p. 107)."
83 Ibid., 142. "However, I was a Sergeant, and I think I did use my best abilities to perform the
duties of the office according to my best knowledge and judgm ent. Indeed, I can say at this late
hour of my life, that my conscious never did, and I trust never will, accuse me of any failure in my
duty to my country, but, on the contrary, I always fulfilled my engagements to her, however she
failed in for fulfilling hers with me." Through another diary entry in 1781, M artin provided an
excellent m anifestation of learning the lessons of leadership and having been transform ed by
service. M artin, now a Sergeant in the Corps of Miners, was on furlough for an extended period in
W est Point, New York. When he returned to camp, he found out that his unit and soldiers had
been ordered south to participate in the siege of Yorktown. Although given permission to rem ain
behind, M artin felt a sense of obligation to his men as a noncomm issioned officer.
84 Ibid., 34.
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that would have been spilt...[But], as I said before, it was well that it ended as it did, both on
account of the honor of the soldiers and the safety of some others.... "8s This was an extreme
example of how bad leadership almost precipitated m utinous conduct. While rash acts are easily
identified, neglect can be ju st as insidious.
Greenman identified poor officer leadership during his first captivity. Greenman also
learned how soldiers perceived leaders' and officers' behaviors. As he and his fellow soldiers were
enduring deplorable conditions in captivity, he m ade the following entry: "we hear that our
officer have thair Liberty of ye town &cfort."86 Greenman made note when the British officers and
officials visited the captive Continental Army soldiers, and even recorded the gist of the
conversations. Very few visits by Continental Army officers are recorded in his diary during his
captivity. This entry of the officers’ visit was Greenman's way of voicing frustration at the seeming
lack of concern of the American officers for the well-being of the enlisted soldiers. As Greenman
was bonding with his fellow captives, he internalized the idea that loyalty works both ways in the
chain of command, as his diary entry suggested. Leaders expect soldiers to be loyal to them , but
soldiers also expect leaders to be loyal in return.8? This is what Baron von Steuben's instructions
to Lieutenants m eant to convey. This type of loyalty would have been im portant in a civilian post
of trust as well.
While Gilbert may not have been an exemplary sergeant off duty, he knew what was
expected of leaders on the march. While his unit m aneuvered for battle, noncommissioned and
commissioned officers were reduced for failing to obey orders against pillaging the local
population. “Seijt. Peck of Capt Bensons Compy got Reduced to Ranks for Going into an oarchard
after apples. Adjt Trotter and Lieut Cooper had their Swords Taken from them for Gettin into a
Turnip yard after Turnips.”88 Bad leadership decisions resulted in the adm inistration of military
justice. Given the practices of eighteenth-century warfare, reductions in rank and lashes were not
uncommon.

8s Ibid., 35.
86 Greenman, D iary, 30.
8? Ibid., 214.. In 1781, when 1st Lieutenant Greenman was captive again, he did not forget his men
even though he was given more freedom as an officer. “T21. This day went to Graves End Neck /
picked a few cucumber, from a friends field and sent to the prisoners in the Sugar house [cipher]”
88 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 37.
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Junior leaders constantly adm inistered or witnessed military justice. Diaries are replete
with punishm ents m eted out to soldiers of all ranks. Some authors have m isread the prevalence of
punishm ents dealt out by courts-m artial as evidence of the arbitrariness of officers in abusing the
enlisted force, when in fact, junior leaders understood the need for a formal system of justice to
prevent even worse forms of soldier (in ju stice and anarchy .89 M artin witnessed many acts of
military justice, but never noted his own application of any punishm ent.
Greenman, Denny, Richards, and Gilbert all recorded their participation in the military
justice system. Their entries indicated necessity, but no great love, for the duty. After Greenman’s
prom otion to commissioned officer, his diaiy became filled with notes referencing duty on courtsm artial panels. Up until the end of the war, he adm inistered military justice on a regular basis,
but not all charges resulted in punishm ent for the accused soldiers.^0 Denny’s notes on military
justice are very sparse with his only extended comments being on the insurrection by disaffected
soldiers and officers in Philadelphia after the war.9 1 Richards recounted having the unpleasant
duty of executing a traitor who had orders to enlist disaffected Continental Army soldiers in the
loyalist cause:
The order being positive, I could do no other than execute it, however unpleasant and
mournful. I forwarded a seijeant with a small party to the place of execution to make the
necessary preparation, and on the 9th of June superintended his execution in presence of
a large concourse of spectators, among which were his own family. After hanging the
hour, the body was taken down, and a request was made from his family that the body

Neimeyer, Am erica Goes to War, 131,136, and 140." The kinds and degrees of resistance
practiced by the soldiers were connected to the kinds and degrees of repression and violence they
suffered at the hands of their officers (p. 136)." Some historians have questioned the discipline
aspect of leadership in the Continental Army by noting the m utinies that occurred at various
periods during the war, num erous courts m artial, and the high rates of desertion. Although any
army hoped to avoid mutinies, crimes punishable by courts martial, and the unauthorized
absence of soldiers, a reexamination of the unique circumstances of the Continental Army
revealed the impact of junior leader development on these issues. W hat Neimeyer failed to
understand about the Continental Army m utinies was that they were extraordinarily disciplined
affairs. The soldiers did not turn into pillaging mobs, desert in mass, or go over to the British.
9 ° Greenman, Diary, 248. "This day set on Court M artial / Tryed Sergt. Crandal for disobedience
of Orders & a Soldier for forging Major olneys Name / both acquited"
9 1 Denny, M ilitary Journal o f M ajor Ebenezer D enny, 7:257. “A few days brought General Howe
from headquarters with a brigade of light troops, for purpose of suppressing the insurrection.
Most of the officers who were here previous to our arrival were arrested, and a few taken in close
custody. General court m artial ordered for their trial. Government were desirous of getting rid of
the arm y in as quiet a m anner as possible; at this particular period it was thought best not to be
too rigid. Howe had his cue; officers released.”
89
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m ight be delivered to them , which of course was readily granted. 9 2
Gilbert’s diaiy, analogous to Greenm an’s, contains num erous military justice actions and
punishm ents, along with the

c r im e s .9 3

In addition to recording their adherence to military

discipline, the soldiers noted their acts of compassion and ability to form bonds with fellow
soldiers, and even the civilians they interacted with, on a daily b a s is .9 4
M artin sums up his ability to form bonds by relating his first meeting with his new
soldiers once he was prom oted to sergeant: "I had of course to form new acquaintances, but I was
not long in doing that; I had a pretty free use of my tongue and was sometimes apt to use it when
there was no occasion for it. However, I soon found myself at hom e with them."95 M artin saw his
fellow soldiers as more than ju st workmates. He saw them as brothers. 9 6 They looked after one
another, as M artin recorded in the following episode: “I told him he should not die there nor
anywhere else that day, if I could help it; and at length with more persuasion and some force I
succeeded in getting him upon his feet again and to moving on.”97 Richards records a sim ilar
episode in his memoirs. “I left him recovering, my heart glowing with the reflection that I had
been the instrum ent of saving a fellow m an from imm ediate death.”98 Much like M artin, Richards
referred to his comrades in arm s as family.99 Greenman wrote several entries, which tracked the
form ation of bonds between men during periods of stress, and the resulting power of those bonds

9 2 Richards,

“Personal Narrative Part II,” 272.
93 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 35. “Roger Alger of Capt. Shays Compy was whipt 50 Lashes
for Stealing” and “This Morning one Smith formally Belonging to Colo. Greatons Regt was Shot to
Death for Desertion and Inlisting severall tim es.”
94 Martin, A Narrative, 83. M artin spent the majority of his time at Valley Forge as a m em ber of
foraging party obtaining supplies from reluctant farm ers in the w inter of 1777-1778. “But I will
give them the credit of never receiving the least abuse or injury from an individual during the
whole tim e I was employed in this business. I doubt w hether the people of New England would
have borne it as patiently, their ‘steady habits’ to the contrary notwithstanding.”
95 Ibid., 141.
96 Ibid., 203. “We had lived together as a family of brothers for several years (setting aside some
little family squabbles, like m ost other families); had shared with each other the hardships,
dangers, and sufferings incident to a soldiers life; had sympathize with each other in trouble and
sickness; had assisted in bearing each other's burdens or strove to make them lighter by council
and advice; had endeavored to conceal each other's faults and make them appear in as good a
light as they would bear. In short, the soldiery, each in his particular circle of acquaintance, was as
strict a band of brotherhood as Masons, and I believe, as faithful to each other.”
97 Ibid., 29.
98 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part I,” 221.
99 Richards, “Personal Narrative Part II,” 278.
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to lift their spirits.100 As the editor of Gilbert’s diary notes, “He was clearly a gregarious individual.
W hether with his regim ent or at home in Brookfield, he was constantly visiting neighbors or
military comrades. He frequently m entions playing ball or "checors" and obviously raised many
convivial glasses. W hen on leave, he seemed to spend as much tim e at friends' homes as with his
family.”101 Gilbert served with men he knew from civilian life and this accounted for the lax
discipline regarding fraternization within the M assachusetts regim ent. Still, the shared sacrifices
strengthened the bonds of the men and allowed Gilbert to hone his inter-personal skills for use in
civilian pursuits after the war. While the bonds between soldiers reinforced their desire to fight
for one another, they still acknowledged their part in a larger organization and purpose.

U nderstanding th e Bigger Picture
Although the soldiers recognized that their regiments were recruited from individual
states, they identified with an American army and fighting for the country of America or the
United States. The soldiers quoted above are representative of the travels that the Continental
Army soldier undertook during the War. Joseph Plumb M artin and Benjamin Gilbert campaigned
from M assachusetts to Virginia. Jerem iah Greenman fought from Quebec to Virginia. Ebenezer
Denny m arched from Pennsylvania to South Carolina. They traveled a large portion of the United
States. If they were parochial or local in the outlook before their tours, service in the Continental
Army forced them to see a larger entity.
Some scholars have downplayed the patriotic motivations or the sense of purpose of the
Continental Army soldier in the years after 1775.102 They question w hether the soldier had any
concept of the United States or the country of America. The w ritten words of the diaries kept

100 Greenman, Diary, 28. Greenman records an event that made an impression on him. At the
beginning of the week, he was very despondent. At the end of the week, the British allowed the
prisoners to get some exercise and play a team sport. "Keep o[u]r Selves ha[r]ty in playin ball in
ye yard." The team sports and further bonding with his fellow prisoners improved his outlook.
The next week he wrote "these [days] very Contented hoping we shall go home in a little wile."
Even though it was another three m onths before Greenman was paroled, he recorded lessons on
the importance of forming bonds. W ithout formal training or an instruction manual, Greenman
observed and recorded inform ation on the forming and m aintaining of a brotherhood as well as
learning how to do it.
101 Benjamin Gilbert, Gilbert Diary, 18.
102 Sellers, “Military History of the American Revolution,” 165. In 1974, John Sellers stated that he
did not think that Privates fought with a true understanding of independence. He doubted the
patriotic fervor of the Privates.
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during the war prove that the junior leaders knew they were fighting for the United States and not
simply a paycheck. The two best indications of this understanding come from the accounts that
underw ent the least am ount of postwar editing. While M artin, Denny, and Richards may have had
sim ilar thoughts at the time, their accounts were composed years after victory had been won.
Greenm an’s and Gilbert’s entries provide contem porary accounts that exhibit soldiers awareness
that they were in service to the United States.
Patriotic fervor may not have been the sole or prim ary m otivator for soldiers enlisting;
however, once they had served in the Continental Army for a year or more, their diary entries
reflect an understanding of the political idea of the United States or America. Individuals serving
in the Continental Army realized they were part of a larger community because of their service.
Levon Powell understood that he was part of an American army on November 7,1777 when he
wrote his wife, “The affair the day before yesterday that not only does great honor to the American
arm s but will in my opinion be of infinite im portance and its consequence. ”103 Jerem iah
Greenman understood that he was part of the United States in May 1777 when he noted that
“order for all our arm s to be carried to town to have them stam ped US.”1Q4 He further recorded on
April 21,1778 when commenting “The town fired 13 rounds of Canon hearing that the French and
Spaniards had declared us independent.”1^ Greenman is even more explicit on July 4,1781: “this
day all the officers that are presant on the Island assembled, to comm amorate the 4

th

July it

being the anniversary of Independency and drank the 13 following 1st. United State of America
maybe ever be independent & Suvering [sovereign],”106 Near the end of the war on July 4,1783,
Greenman records some final toasts: “2nc^The United States & their congress,...1 0 ^ May the
characture of America never be sullied by Ingratitude to her delivers... ”107
Benjamin Gilbert saw the larger comm unity after four years in the Continental Army
when he wrote his family, “the providential trane of sircumstances which leat to it affords the

Leven Powell, “Leven Powell Papers” (Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library,
College of William and Mary, n.d.), November 7,1777, Special Collections Research Center, Swem
Library, College of William and Mary.
104 Greenman, Diary, 73.
105 Ibid., 115.
106 Ibid., 212.
107 Ibid., 266.
103
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m ost convincing proof th at the liberties of america is the object of divine protection.”108 He
referred to the liberties of America rather to his state or himself. He was not above taking swipes
at other states, though. While campaigning in Virginia before the Battle of Yorktown, he wrote to
a friend, “The country appears to be devoted to their services, and it is as hard a m atter to find a
sincere frind to his country in this part of the state as it is to find a Tory in the state of
M assachusetts Bay. ”109 Gilbert clearly imagined himself as part of a larger country and disparaged
those individuals in states who did not support America. His private comm ents notwithstanding,
his and the others’ ability to manage sectional and local differences benefited these leaders when
they moved to new settings.
W ithin newly forming communities, the recently arrived soldiers possessed neither fame,
social status, wealth, nor established connections in their new neighborhoods. It is doubtful that
service alone in the Continental Army would have provided a significant advantage to any
candidate for local positions of responsibility. Continental Army Soldiers were not venerated
nationwide until 1818.110 Numerous studies have shown that soldiers did not get wealthy from
their service in the war. They may have had bounty money or a land grant, but little else. They
entered an emerging social situation formed with people from num erous backgrounds who were
trying to establish communities where they could survive and possibly prosper. Fortunately for
the noncommissioned officers and junior commissioned officers, this was familiar territory based
on their military experience. Army service may not have made them better farm ers or m erchants,
b u t it did equip them with the skills necessary to form groups and survive under the rule of law.
H is to r io g r a p h ic a l C o n tr ib u tio n
Previous scholars made judgm ents on the postwar success of Continental Army soldiers
prim arily using the pension applications filed from 1818 to 1832. The justifications for public
assistance listed on the pensions are not the final word on w hether the soldiers were successful
after the war. The lack of m onetary m eans or land holdings was not unusual for individuals who

108 Gilbert, W inding Down, 22.
109 Ibid., 41.
110 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 1,4. “The country greeted them with indifference; it quickly forgot
them." and "By 1818, however, the nation embraced a new view of the Revolutionary War."
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lived into their old age.111 The need to provide dowries for daughters or inheritances for sons
often depleted any m onetary gains and divided farm s into smaller parcels. Continental Army
soldiers who first applied for pensions in 1818 would have been in their early sixties, which was
past the prim e for farm labor or other m anual tasks. It is not surprising that they would have not
been still working farms or engaging in heavy labor. Their m aterial possessions would have been
limited. Tools of the trade as well as farm im plem ents and livestock would have been passed down
to children or sold to the next generation.112 It is im portant to note that the claim was based on
their contem porary economic well-being. W hat they had done in the previous 40 to 50 years was
not a factor in determ ining awarding of a pension. This is the gap in analysis that previous
historians have missed when arguing that military service in the Continental Army disadvantaged
men in their postwar lives.
Some historians have pointed to the fact that soldiers moved from their hometowns soon
after demobilization as evidence of the lack of economic prospects for form er soldiers. This may
have been true of all single men in their home towns, regardless of whether they served in the
Army or not. It was certainly true in New England before the w ar .n 3 Other historians such as
John Resch have highlighted the lack of economic and social mobility of returning veterans to
established communities such as Peterborough, New Hampshire, as evidence of the deleterious
effect of Continental Army service on men. The key fact in Resch’s analysis is the m en were from
all sections of a society with established social strata already in place. Men returned to a closed
society that hindered upward movement. A few close kin networks controlled social and economic
opportunity in Peterborough.1^ The assessments from Resch’s study are not universally
applicable to all Continental Army veterans. Unfortunately, his work, referenced in m ost histories
of the w ar published since 1999, was the last m ajor work on soldiers after the war.
As fine a work as Resch's study is, it misses the more interesting story of what happened
111 Robert A. Gross, The M inutem en and Their World, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976),
107. "Members of the older generation had no answers. They had their own anxieties. They were
failing as parents: failing to pass on their property and status to the next generation, failing to
direct their children to their proper roles in life...What would happen to them when they were old
and in need of help?"
112 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 164. Description of retirem ent contracts.
n 3 Gross, The M inutem en and Their World, 8 7-89.
u4 Resch, Suffering Soldiers, 16. "By 1775 many Peterborough families orbited around two large
kin networks."
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to Continental Army soldiers who did not return to their previous occupations in their hometowns
after the war. Historians have noted that many demobilized soldiers moved west into newly
available lands in the years after the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Unfortunately, historians have
concluded that the soldiers m et with further ostracization and economic failure based on their
pension applications. However, the evidence suggests that the soldiers put to use the skills in
leadership learned in the Continental Army to obtain positions of trust in their new communities.
This was especially true of non-com m issioned officers and junior officers who obtained their rank
in the army through merit.

Postw ar C ontributions
As a form er sergeant, Joseph Plumb M artin put his army skills to work over the next fifty
years in Maine. As a biography sketch noted in 1876: “In securing an act of incorporation for his
adopted town, in reducing the place to system and order as a civil community, he bore a
prom inent part. He held various stations of trust, being repeatedly selectmen, representative to
the state legislature, and for over a quarter of a century town clerk. ”ns These positions of trust
hardly seem like the m ark of a failure. M artin moved from his birthplace, where he evidently had
little chance of prosperity, to an unsettled area of the future state of Maine, and made his mark.
Greenman experienced financial disappointm ent when he returned to his hometown and
attem pted to make a living as a shopkeeper. When shop keeping did not provide an adequate
living, he entered the m erchant m arine where he made a num ber of voyages. He eventually got his
m aster’s certificate and began to captain vessels. Greenman also kept up a steady barrage of
letters to friends and acquaintances to secure employment in a federal position or a commission
in the new Army. Neither of these two courses of action came to fruition, so in 1806, he moved to
Ohio to take advantage of his bounty land and become a farmer. The land he settled on was not
ideal for raising crops, but he established him self in the community. W ithin six years, he was
repeatedly elected the township justice of the peace.116 While Greenman was a landowner, he
clearly was not a wealthy farm er. His skills, developed and honed in the army, convinced his new
ns Joseph Williamson, “Biographical Sketch of Joseph P. M artin, of Prospect, Maine, A
Revolutionary Soldier,” The N ew -England Historical and Genealogical Register (1874-1905),
July 1876.
116 Greenman, Diary, xvi-xxvii.
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neighbors that he could be trusted with a position of authority.
Of the five individuals examined in this paper, Ebenezer Denny had the greatest success
after the w ar in employing his skills learned while in service. Denny continued in the Army and
served in several campaigns in the Northwest Territory. He eventually made Major. His post
military career was ju st as successful. Denny settled in the area around Fort Pitt. Neighbors
elected him a county commissioner and to the state legislature in 1797. In 1804, business
associates appointed him director of the Bank of Pennsylvania, which later became a branch of
the Bank of the United States.11? W hen the Pennsylvania legislature incorporated Pittsburgh in
1816, Denny was elected the first mayor.118 His military service and skills contributed to earning
all these positions of trust. Denny is another example of a Revolutionary W ar soldier who was not
broken by service, but actually thrived because of it.
Samuel Richards’ story after the war differs from the others in one critical detail. Because
he obtained a federal position, Postm aster General of Farmington, Connecticut, he did not have to
move to provide for his family. His long military service in the Connecticut regim ent from the
beginning to the end of the w ar did allow him to develop a network of friends and supporters. He
honed his ability to manage men and developed a patronage network, which assisted his efforts to
garner a plum federal job. However, his efforts were not entirely self-serving. In his community,
he served as a deacon for his local church for a num ber of years and lent his talents to assisting
soldiers to receive pensions. As a deacon in his local congregation, his fellow worshipers thought
he exhibited all the qualities listed in the Bible’s 1 Timothy 3:1-13. Richards clearly had their trust
and he m aintained trust with his fellow soldiers as shown by his work with their pensions.
Richards was successful in his postw ar career in his birth community due to a federal job, but he
still put his army-developed skills to use in his community.
Benjamin Gilbert’s postwar life alm ost matches the success of Denny’s accomplishments.
Gilbert moved to an undeveloped portion of New York near Otsego Lake. He helped form
Montgomery County in 1791, was appointed sheriff in 1792, and served in the position for ten of
the next eleven years. Elected positions include supervisor from 1803-1809 and 1812-1816. Other

Denny, M ilitary Journal o f M ajor Ebenezer Denny, 7:229.
118 Ibid., 7:234.
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duties included justice of the peace, surveyor, and town clerk. Gilbert’s diary indicated a very
social m an who liked the company of others, male and female. He was also a Mason and helped
found the Otsego Lodge in Cooperstown . n 9 While these qualities and connections certainly helped
his rise, the experience and skills learned during extended service in the Continental Army proved
the critical element. Familiarity with the application of justice and experience as a quarterm aster
and supplies would have proved invaluable in the chartering of a new town and the m anagem ent
of resources and people. The Continental Army prepared Gilbert well for his civilian pursuits after
demobilization.

C onclusion
The review of postw ar life completes the examination of the five subjects. The soldiers’
unpresum ing origins before enlistm ent identified none destined or m arked for greatness. In fact,
any potential at all for the individuals to advance into leadership positions would have been
doubtful. Their memoirs reveal men changed by their tim e in the Army. Entries describing their
first times in combat disclosed scared m en who learned to face their fears and deal with uncertain
situations. This ability proved beneficial to those embarking on journeys to new towns and
establishing law and order. They received training in the army that went beyond on-the-job
observation. Through personal training by von Steuben or his disciples and a clearly written
manual, they learned the tenets of being a good leader. As they continued through their careers,
they m ade note of episodes that proved their competence. These hard won skills furnished the
ability and confidence to shoulder positions of trust. Enough evidence exists to argue military
service and training equipped Continental Army junior leaders with skills critical to their postwar
success when they moved to new communities as the nation expanded.
More was needed than solely learning how to march, fire a musket, and follow orders,
which would have been fam iliar to soldiers of any army of the time. Due to unique circumstances,
the United States had to form a cadre of junior leaders to m an its professional units. Through a
combination of long-term service, von Steuben’s m anual and training program, and m erit-based
promotions, the Continental Army created a competent corps of sergeants, lieutenants, and
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captains. While militarily competent and tactically proficient in drill and maneuver, these junior
leaders also left the army with skills they could transfer to civilian pursuits. Their diaries and
letters show they understood the changes they had undergone while fighting in the war. When
m atched against the tenets written in von Steuben’s manual, there emerged a remarkable
correlation. The writers believed they had m et the standards of what von Steuben’s m anual
required of junior leaders and they wanted to record their success. The tone of the memoirs
composed after the war clearly attributed their postwar success to lessons learned during service.
Individual editors of the diaries used in this study noted their subjects’ postwar success and the
impact of service. W hat has been missing from the histories is a study of a sizable portion of the
form er veteran junior leaders as they moved to new communities during the early Republic’s
expansion. Over half of the demobilized veterans moved from their birth locations or places of
enlistm ent. A substantial num ber moved west into the newly forming states. The sources used in
this paper show that these individuals had much in common. Further research is possible on
those individuals who did not bequeath fully formed memoirs or completed diaries to historians.
Sources of biographical data such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the pension
applications provide excellent repositories to identify other junior leaders and reconstruct their
postw ar lives. The period after the Revolutionary W ar saw one of the greatest expansions of the
nation. Eleven states were settled, organized, and adm itted into the union by 1821.120 Between
1783 and 1821 would have been the prim e years for junior leaders to contribute to their
communities. The form er soldiers may not have been financially successful in their later years,
but their contributions to the growth of the U nited States may have been overlooked. This study
clearly dem onstrates that further work is needed to illuminate the junior leaders’ continued
service to their country.

120 Eleven additional states were adm itted into the union by 1821 after the original 13 ratified the
US Constitution in 1787. (Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi,
Illinois, Alabama, Maine, and Missouri.) It would be fifteen years until the next state, Arkansas,
entered the union in 1836.
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